Hello, this is RJ Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in Cox Communication, Incorporated, versus Sony Music Entertainment. Sertiari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, argued December 1st, 2025, and decided March 25, 2026. Under the Copyright Act, anyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of a copyright owner is an infringer of the copyright. That's 17 USC Section 501A. This court has also recognized two categories of secondary liability, which means liability for the copyright infringement of another. Those two categories are contributory liability and vicarious liability. That's from Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios versus Grossker. This case concerns contributory liability, which requires that a provider intended its service to be used for infringement. A copyright owner can show the requisite intent in two ways. First, it can show that a party affirmatively induced the infringement, or second, it can show that a party sold a service tailored to infringement. These two bases for contributory liability track patent law, C35 USC sections 1271B and C. Cox Communications Incorporated is an Internet service provider serving approximately 6 million subscribers, each associated with a unique Internet protocol address. Internet service providers like Cox have limited knowledge about how their services are used. They know which IP address corresponds to which subscriber account, but cannot distinguish individual users or directly control how services are used. Cox contractually prohibits subscribers from using their connection to post, copy, transmit, or disseminate content that infringes copyrights. Sony Music Entertainment and other major music copyright owners enlisted Mark Monitor to track copyright infringement across the Internet. Mark Monitor's software detects when copyrighted works are illegally uploaded or downloaded and traces the activity to particular IP addresses. During the roughly two-year period at issue, Mark Monitor sent Cox 163,148 notices identifying IP addresses of Cox subscribers associated with infringement. Sony sued Cox in federal district court, advancing two theories of secondary copyright liability. First, Sony alleged that Cox contributed to its users' infringement by continuing to provide internet service to subscribers whose IP addresses Cox knew were associated with infringement. Second, Sony alleged that Cox was vicariously liable for its users' infringement. The jury found in favor of Sony on both theories, found Cox's infringement willful, and awarded $1 billion in statutory damages. The district court denied Cox's post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law in relevant part. The Fourth Circuit affirmed as to contributory liability, reasoning that supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is exactly the sort of culpable conduct sufficient for contributory infringement. The Fourth Circuit reversed as to vicarious liability. This court granted Cox's petition for sortiori as to contributory liability. And the Supreme Court held that the decision below is reversed and remanded, and Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court. The provider of a service is contributorily liable for a user's infringement only if it intended that the provided service be used for infringement, which can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement. Cox neither induced its user's infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. Accordingly, Cox is not contributorily liable for the infringement of Sony's copyrights. The Copyright Act does not expressly render anyone liable for infringement committed by another. That's Sony Corporation of America versus Universal Studios Incorporated. Ordinarily, when Congress intends to impose secondary liability, it does so expressly. That's Central Bank of Denver, North America versus First Interstate Bank of Denver, North America. The court's precedents have recognized specific forms of secondary copyright liability that predated the Copyright Act, but the court is loath to expand such liability beyond those precedents. Under this court's precedence, the internet required for contributory liability, the intent required for contributory liability can be shown only if the party induced the infringement or the provided service is tailored to that infringement. See Groakster and Sony. A provider induces infringement if it actively encourages infringement through specific acts, as in Grosker, where file sharing software companies promoted and marketed their software as a tool to infringe copyrights. A service is tailored to infringement if it is not capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses. That's from a Ginsberg concurrence in the Grookster case. For example, in Sony, the court held that sale of the Betamax videotape recorder to the general public did not constitute contributory contributory infringement. It reasoned that the tape recorder was capable of substantial non-infringing uses, because it could be used to record copyrighted television programs for later personal viewing, which would not constitute infringement, even though it could also be used to reproduce and sell copyrighted programming, which would constitute infringement. The court has repeatedly made clear see Calum Corporation vs. Harper Brothers, Sony, and Grookster that mere knowledge that a service will be used to infringe is insufficient to establish the required intent to infringe. Cox neither induced its users infringement nor provided a service tailored to infringement. As for inducement, Cox did not induce or encourage its subscribers to infringe in any manner. That's from Croakster. Sony provided no evidence of express promotion, marketing, and intent to promote infringement. And Cox repeatedly discouraged copyright infringement by sending warnings, suspending services, and terminating accounts. As for providing a service tailored to infringement, Cox's internet service was clearly capable of substantial or commercially significant non-infringing uses. Cox simply provided internet access, which is used for many purposes other than copyright infringement. The Four Circuits holding went beyond the two forms of liability recognized in Groakster and Sony by holding that supplying a product with knowledge that the recipient will use it to infringe copyrights is sufficient for contributory infringement. This holding went beyond the two bases for contributory liability recognized in the court's precedent and conflicted with the court's repeated admonition that contributory liability cannot rest only on a provider's knowledge of infringement, an insufficient act to prevent it. Sony argues that the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, safe harbor, under which Internet service providers cannot be secondarily liable for certain forms of copyright infringement if they have implemented a policy that provides for the termination in appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders who are repeated infringers. That's from 17 USC Section 512 I1 CAPA would have no effect if internet service providers are not liable for providing internet service to known infringers. The DMCA does not expressly impose liability for internet service providers who serve known infringers. It merely creates new defenses from liability for such providers. The DMCA itself made clear that failure to comply with the safe harbor rules shall not bear adversely upon a defense by the service provider as here, that the service provider's conduct is not infringing. Section 512 L page 10. Oh, sorry, Pacific 1093 Fourth 222 is reversed and remanded. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Alito, Kegan, Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett joined. Justice Sotomayora filed a opinion concurring in the judgment in which Justice Jackson joined. Thanks for listening. You can always reach out at uh Rhodes Scholar80 at gmail.com or uh find my new website at lokiesque.law. Thanks.