Hello, this is Jeff Barnum reading the Supreme Court syllabus in RICO v. United States, Sir Shorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Argued November 3rd, 2025, decided March 25, 2026. A criminal defendant on supervised release from federal prison must comply with various conditions, both mandatory, such as commit no more crimes, see 18 United States Code, section 3583 sub D, and discretionary, commonly, report to a probation officer as directed, and notify the probation officer promptly of any change in address, that's sections 3563 sub B 15 and 17. Violating a prescribed condition may result in the revocation of supervised release and a return to prison, as well as an additional term of supervised release after imprisonment. After petitioner Isabel Rico violated the terms of her supervised release conditions, the judge revoked her release and ordered her to serve two additional months of additional imprisonment and a new 42-month term of supervised release set to expire in 2021. When released the second time, Miss Rico again violated her conditions by changing her residence without notifying her probation officer. A warrant issued for her arrest, but federal authorities did not locate her until January 2023. As relevant here, during her abscondment, Miss Rico committed a state law drug offense in January 2022, which resulted in a conviction. Back in federal district court, the judge treated Miss Rico's drug offense as a grade A violation of her supervised release conditions and sentenced her to 16 months of incarceration, followed by two more years of supervised release. Miss Rico appealed, arguing that the district court lacked authority to treat her drug offense as a supervised release violation because that offense occurred after her supervised term expired in June 2021. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, describing Miss Rico's abscondment as having told the clock so that her term continued to run until federal authorities caught up with her in 2023. Because of that, the Ninth Circuit held, Miss Rico's January 2022 drug offense could count as a violation of her supervised release. This court granted Sir Sherore to resolve a circuit split on whether abscondment automatically extends a term of supervised release. Held, the Sentencing Reform Act does not authorize a rule automatically extending a defendant's term of supervised release when the defendant absconds. What the Ninth Circuit's challenge rule really does is use a defendant's abscondment to extend, not toll, the period of supervised release beyond what a judge has ordered. Automatically extending a term of supervised release is not among the many tools the Sentencing Reform Act provides courts to address defendants who fail to report or otherwise violate their supervised release conditions. The Act instructs that a term of supervised release starts the day the person is released from imprisonment and generally sets maximum lengths at one, three, or five years, depending on the severity of the underlying offense. Neither provision hints at an automatic extension rule, and the Ninth Circuit rule risks permitting courts to extend supervised release beyond the statutory minimums set by Congress. The Act also authorizes courts to revoke supervised release and impose additional imprisonment and supervised release for violations, but makes no mention of automatic extension for abscondment. Further, an automatic extension rule disregards the limits in the Act's specific extension and tolling rules. Section 3583 sub-E2 generally permits courts to extend supervised release only after holding a hearing and considering various sentencing factors and not beyond statutory minimums or after the term has expired. Section 3583 sub-I allows revocation proceedings after a defendant's term of supervised release has expired only for matters arising before expiration and only if a warrant or summons issued during the term. Section 3624 sub-E provides a true tolling rule, suspending supervised release during imprisonment of 30 consecutive days or more. The cumulative detail of these instructions strongly suggests the absence of anything like the Ninth Circuit's rule is intentional rather than an oversight. The government's arguments fail to support the Ninth Circuit's rule. The government argues because supervision requires observation and direction, and Miss Rico received neither while absconding, she should receive no credit for that period. But the cited provisions merely describe the probation officers' duties and indicate that supervision occurs only during the term imposed by the sentence in court, which hurts rather than helps the government's cause. Moreover, the government's theory treats Miss Rico as off and on supervised release at the same time. The government's precedent arguments are also unconvincing. Mont v. United States, 587 U.S. 514, a Supreme Court case from 2019, simply recognized that Section 3624 Sub-E's express terms suspend a defendant's term during imprisonment for a separate state offense, which highlights the absence of anything like the Ninth Circus rule. And United States v. Johnson, 529 U.S. 53, a Supreme Court case from 2000, rejected an effort to adorn the act with a rule Congress did not enact, much as the court does today. The government's common law argument, that courts historically held unescaped time on the run from prison does not count toward discharge of a sentence, may rest on sound premises, but reaches an unsound conclusion. The government seeks not a rule that stops the clock or ensures a defendant takes no advantage of abscondment, but one that imposes new punishment by automatically extending supervised release. Unlike an escaped prisoner who is not serving his sentence, under the Ninth Circuit rule, a defendant who fails to report remains bound by release terms and may be punished for violations. The Act already provides many ways to ensure defendants do not profit from violations without automatically extended the period beyond what a judge ordered. The government's policy plea, that Section 3583 sub-I's warrant or summons requirement may leave courts powerless when probation officers do not timely realize a defendant's absence is misdirected. The proper place to register that complaint is with Congress, as this court is not free to rewrite the directions Congress has provided. Reversed and remanded. Justice Gorsus delivered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Sotomayor, Kagan, Kavanaugh, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion. Thank you for listening. Please help us by rating and reviewing this podcast wherever you get your podcasts, and make sure you subscribe so you can get all of the OT twenty five decisions automatically delivered to your device. If you wish to communicate with the podcast, please click the link in the show notes or email us at SCOTISDisions at gmail.com. Thanks, and have a great day.