Hello, this is Jeff Barnum reading the Supreme Court syllabus in Hensley vs. Flora Corporation et al., surtiory to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Argued November 3, 2025, decided April 22, 2026. Military contractor Flora Corporation hired Ahmed Naeb to work at a U.S. base in Afghanistan as part of the Afghan First Initiative, a military program that required contractors to hire Afghans to help stimulate the local economy and stabilize the Afghan government. Naheeb, a Taliban operative, later carried out a suicide bomb attack at the base that killed five and wounded 17. The Army's investigation found Flore primarily responsible for the attack because it negligently supervised Nayab in complying with base procedures. Former Army specialist Winston T. Hensley, who suffered a fractured skull and brain injuries in the course of stopping Naiab before he could reach a larger crowd, sued Flor in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, seeking damages under South Carolina law for negligent supervision, negligent entrustment of tools, and negligent retention of Naiab. The District Court entered summary judgment for Floor, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed. It held that during wartime, state law claims against military contractors under military command arising out of combatant activities are preempted. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Federal Tort Claim Act's combatant activities exception, which preserves the federal government's immunity against claims arising out of the combatant activities of the military during wartime, also reflects a congressional intent to bar tort suits against contractors connected with those combatant activities, even when the contractor is alleged to have violated its instructions from the military. Held. The Fourth Circuit erred in finding Hensley's state law tort claims preempted, where the federal government neither ordered nor authorized Flores challenged conduct. Neither the Constitution nor any federal statute expressly preempts Hensley's suit. The Supremacy Clause requires state law to yield only when it conflicts with rights or restrictions that stem from the Constitution or a valid federal statute or treaty. Here, no constitutional provision or federal statute expressly preempts Hensley's suit, and the court has already held that the Federal Tort Claims Act, or FTCA's combatant activities exception, does not itself apply to suits against federal contractors. Lacking any constitutional or statutory text supporting preemption, the Fourth Circuit relied on Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 487 U.S. 500, a Supreme Court case from 1988. Boyle does not support the Fourth Circuit's preemption rule. Boyle involved a procurement contract, not a performance contract like the one here, and it did not involve the FTCA's combatant activities exception. More importantly, Boyle recognized displacement of state law only when there is a significant conflict between state law and an identifiable federal policy or interest. Boyle accordingly protects a contractor only when the government directed the contractor to do the very thing challenged in the suit. Hensley, by contrast, suit for for conduct that was not authorized by the military and was allegedly contrary to federal instructions. Boyle's reasoning thus contradicts the Fourth Circuit's analysis. Even assuming a uniquely federal interest in regulating military bases overseas, no significant conflict exists between that interest and state law negligence liability based on a contractor's departure from military instructions. The Fourth Circuit's preemption test sweeps too broadly. The FTCA's combatant activities exception protects the government's own combat-related decisions. Any comparable federal interest would therefore preempt state law only where the challenged conduct can fairly be treated as the military's own conduct or decision. But the Fourth Circuit expressly concluded that resolving Hensley's claim would not require evaluating the reasonables of military judgments, and it nonetheless found preemption simply because the suit arose in a wartime combat setting. Boyle's rationale justifies no such blanket preemption. Nor does the Constitution structure implicitly bar this suit. Although the Constitution gives Congress and the President broad war powers, that assignment has never been understood to bar all war-related tort suits, and federal contractors do not automatically share the government's immunity merely because they perform services for it. Absent a statute, to the contrary, states can regulate or tax federal contractors on the same terms as any private company. Floor does not attempt to, and could not, invoke a defense under Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Company, 309 U.S. 18, a Supreme Court case from 1940. The Yearsley Doctrine shields a contractor only when it is being sued precisely for accomplishing what the federal government requested. Because Flore is alleged to have acted outside the authority the military granted it, Yearsley does not apply. Vacated and remanded. Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the court, in which Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, Gorsuch, Barrett, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined. Thank you for listening. Please help us by rating and reviewing this podcast wherever you get your podcasts. And make sure you subscribe so you can get all of the OT twenty-five decisions automatically delivered to your device. If you wish to communicate with the podcast, please email us at SCOTISDIS at gmail.com or click the link in the show notes. Thanks and have a great day.