Hello. This is R.J. Deacon, reading the Supreme Court of United States syllabus in Ambridge Energy versus Nessel, Attorney General of Michigan, on behalf of the people of the state of Michigan. Sirtiari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, argued February 24, 2026, and decided April 22nd, 2026. Petitioners, collectively Ambridge, own and operate Line 5, a 645-mile petroleum pipeline, four miles of which traverse the Straits of Mackinac, pursuant to a 1953 easement granted to Embridge's predecessor by the state of Michigan. On June 27, 2019, the Michigan Attorney General filed suit in Michigan State Court seeking to halt Embridge's operation of Line 5 by having the 1953 easement declared void and Embridge's continuing operations declared unlawful. Enbridge was served with the complaint on July 12, 2019. Rather than removing the case to federal court within the 30-day deadline required by 28 U.S.C. Section 1446 B1, Enbridge litigated in state court for months. In November 2020, more than a year after Enbridge's removal deadline had lapsed, the Michigan governor issued a notice revoking the 1953 easement and filed a separate lawsuit in state court against Enbridge. In that suit, unlike in the Attorney General's suit, Enbridge timely removed to federal court, and the parties agreed to hold the Attorney General's case in abeyance while federal proceedings progressed. After the district court denied the governor's motion to remand, finding federal question jurisdiction satisfied, the governor voluntarily dismissed her lawsuit. On December 15, 2021, 887 days after receiving the Attorney General's complaint, Embridge removed this action to federal court. The Attorney General moved to remand, arguing that removal was untimely under 1446B's 30-day deadline. The district court denied the motion, holding that equitable principles justified excusing Embridge's untimely removal and certified its order for interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that although 1446 B1's deadline is non-jurisdictional, several features of 1446 B1 and the overall removal scheme rebutted any presumption of equitable tolling. Thus, the lawsuit had to be remanded to the Michigan State Court. This court granted Sir Girari to resolve a divide among the courts of appeals on whether 1446 B1 is subject to equitable tolling. Held. Because Section 1446 B1's text structure and context are inconsistent with echo equitable tolling, Embridge's removal was untimely. The fact that the 30-day removal deadline in 1446 B1 is non-jurisdictional does not automatically render it subject to equitable tolling. While jurisdictional requirements cannot be waived or forfeited and do not allow for equitable exceptions. Bochler versus Commissioner from uh the mere fact that a time limit lacks jurisdictional force does not render it malleable in every respect. That's Nutraceutical Court versus Lambert. Some non-jurisdictional rules remain mandatory and are not susceptible of equitable tolling. The court need not decide whether 1446 B1 qualifies as a statute of limitations subject to a presumption of equitable tolling, because even if the presumption applies, it can be rebutted if there is good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable tolling doctrine to apply. That's Arellano versus McDonough. Here, the text structure and context of 1446 B1 demonstrate that Congress did not want the 30-day deadline to be equitably tolled. The text of 1446 B1 speaks in strict mandatory terms, requiring that a notice of removal shall be filed within 30 days. Although such mandatory language alone is not sufficient to rebut the presumption of equitable tolling, it is consistent with treating the deadline as mandatory and not subject to equitable tolling. Compare uh Bochler. More important and decisive here is fourteen forty six B one's structure. An explicit listing listing of exceptions set forth in a detailed manner strongly indicates that Congress did not intend courts to read other unmentioned open-ended equitable exceptions into the statute. Um it's United States' versus Brocamp. Uh that is especially so when these specific exceptions already reflect equitable considerations. That's Arielano. There are several such exceptions here. First, and functioning much like an equitable discovery rule, Section 1446 B3 provides an extension when a case at first appears unremovable, but it is later ascertained that the case is or has become removable. Congress thus has already effectively allowed for equitable tolling in one respect, but not others. That's uh Ariolano again. Exceptions to the 30-day deadline outside of section 1446 confirm the point. For actions against foreign states, Congress specifically allowed the time limitations of 1446 B to be enlarged at any time for cause shown, section 1441D. Similar provisions exist for certain intellectual property cases, see section 1454 B2, and cases involving fatal accidents, see section 1441E1. Each provision explicitly incorporates Section 1446B1's time limit, but modifies it to allow equitable case-specific exceptions that would be inexplicable and unnecessary if Congress already understood 1446-B1 to contain a cross-cutting equitable tolling rule. Congress's treatment of removal in criminal proceedings provides additional confirmation. Under Section 1455 B-1, a criminal defendant must generally remove within 30 days after arraignment, but for good cause shown, a court may grant leave to file at a later time. For civil cases, by contrast, Congress did not provide courts with similar general power to extend the 30-day removal deadline. The nature of the subject matter here further underscores the unavailability of equitable tolling. BPPLC versus Mayor and City Council of Baltimore is a site there. And a general interest in avoiding prolonged litigation on threshold non-merits questions, see PowerX Corp versus Reliant Energy Services, Inc. Allowing equitable tolling would undermine Congress's manifest intent in resolving threshold removal questions early and conclusively, generating uncertainty and risking significant waste of resources. CF Beggarly. Enbridge's counterarguments are not persuasive. Enbridge argument that rebutting the presumption of equitable tolling requires the clearest command from Congress conflicts with the court's repeated holdings that the presumption is rebutted where Congress's choice is evident. Arielano again, where tolling would be inconsistent with the text of the relevant statute, Beggarly again, and where there is good reason to believe Congress did not want equitable tolling to apply. In Brook camp. Enbridge's attempt to characterize Section 1446B3 as an accrual rule rather than an exception does not account for the separate bad faith exception in Section 1446C1 or the many other provisions outside Section 1446 that expressly allow courts to toll Section 1446 B1's deadline for cause shown. The fact that these provisions are located outside of Section 1446 itself does not diminish their force. Courts must consider equitable tollings in congruence with the statutory scheme overall. That's Arielano. Finally, and Bridge's argument based on Section 1447 C's treatment of defects in subject matter jurisdiction does not support equitable tolling. The decision below is affirmed, and Justice Sotomayor delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Thanks for listening, everybody. If you want to get a hold of me, I'm at uh Rhodes Scholar80 at gmail.com. That's R O A D S, like the truck drive in Rhodes Scholar, and then the number 8080 at gmail.com.