Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)

MONTGOMERY v. CARIBE TRANSPORT II, LLC

Attorney RJ Dieken, Loki Esq Law, Montana Season 2025 Episode 32

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A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAAAA because States retain authority 

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Hello, this is RJ Deacon, reading the Supreme Court of the United States opinion syllabus in Montgomery v. Carby Transport II. Sertiary to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Argued March 4, 2026, and decided May 14, 2026. Petitioner Sean Montgomery sustained severe and permanent injuries after his tractor trailer was stuck by a truck driven by respondent Yosinio Verrilla Mohenna. Verrilla Mojena was driving a load of plastic pots through Illinois for respondent Carby Transport II, LLC, a motor carrier. Respondent CH Robinson Worldwide, Incorporated, a transportation broker, had coordinated the shipment. Montgomery sued all respondents in Federal District Court and alleged, among other things, that C.H. Robinson was liable for his injuries because it negligently hired Varella Mohenna and Carbi Transport. Montgomery claimed that C.H. Robinson knew or should have known from Carbi Transport's safety rating that hiring it to transport goods was reasonably likely to result in crashes that would injure others. The district court held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act, that's FAA, which I'm going to call F Quad A or something, which preempts state laws related to the prices, routes, and services of the trucking industry. 49 USC Section 14501C1 expressly preempted Montgomery's negligent hiring claim against C.H. Robinson. The district court further held that the claim did not fall within F Quad A's safety exception, which provides that the F quad A preemption provision shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles. Section fourteen five oh one C two A. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the court granted sortiary to the to resolve whether the FAA's safety exception permits negligent hiring claims against brokers like CH Robinson that coordinates shipments in the transportation industry. The Supreme Court held. Decision below is reversed and remanded, and Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. A claim that one company negligently hired another to transport goods is not preempted by the FAA because states retain the authority to regulate safety with respect to motor vehicles under the Act. Even if the FAA otherwise preempts Montgomery's negligent hiring claim against C.H. Robinson, the safety exception saves it. The relevant text provides that the F Quad A's preemption provision shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles. Section 14501 C2 CAPA All agree that common law duties and standards of care form part of a state's authority to regulate safety. Negligent hiring claims impose a duty of reasonable care in employing a contractor for work carrying a risk of physical harm. The preemption question thus boils down to whether negligent hiring claims of the type Montgomery presses are with respect to motor vehicles. Because the F Quad A supplies no definition of with respect to, the court gives the phrase its ordinary meaning. Following dictionary definitions, the court has construed the same phrase in the F Quad A's preemption provision to mean concerns. That's Dan's City Used Cars Incorporated versus Pilkey. The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act defines motor vehicle as a vehicle, machine, tractor, trailer, or semi-trailer propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used on a highway in transportation. That's section thirteen one oh two at sixteen. Putting the pieces together, a claim is with respect to motor vehicles if it concerns the vehicles used in transportation. Here, requiring CH Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier concerns motor vehicles. Most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. Montgomery's negligent hiring claim thus falls within the F Quad's safety exception, which saves it from preemption. C.H. Robinson's counterarguments are unpersuasive. Constructing the safety exception as Montgomery requests does not mean that it saves everything preempted by the F Quad's express preemption provision. The safety exception saves only a subset of preempted claims, those involving regulations concerning motor vehicle safety. State laws related to motor carrier prices, routes, and services that have no relationship to safety remain preempted. C.H. Robinson argues that Montgomery's interpretation of the safety exception creates surplusage. But surplusage exists, however, the disputed phrase with respect to motor vehicles is defined, because any overlap comes from the reference to a state regulatory authority over safety. Finally, CH Robinson asserts that interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection B of the F Quad A, which preempts state regulation of intrastate rates, routes, and services. And that was intrastate of any freight broker, freight forwarder or broker. Alright, I'm reading that one again. Finally, CH Robinson asserts that interpreting the safety exception to cover brokers would create an anomaly with subsection B of the F Quad A, which preempts state regulation of intrastate rates, routes, or services of any freight forwarder or broker. Section 14501B1. Unlike subsection C, subsection B does not contain a safety exception. C. H. Robinson invokes this textual difference as a reason that subsection C's safety exception should be read to exclude brokers. While it is not obvious why Congress included a safety exception in C but not B, it would be even odder to say that the alleged tort, the negligent hiring of an unsafe motor carrier whose truck caused injury, is not an exercise of the safety regulatory authority of a state with respect to motor vehicles under Section 14501C2A. The text of subsection C2A controls. The decision below is reversed and remanded. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Justice Kavanaugh filed a concurring opinion, in which Justice Alito joined. Thanks for listening. I would say I'm happy that the uh brokers can be uh, as a truck driver of 14 years, I'm pretty happy that brokers can be held responsible for that because they have been uh doing a really terrible job of it in recent years. Uh I do some trucking law, and I can't even get a Justice of the Peace misdemeanor judge to listen to me about um about trucking law. And we've got way stations dragging truckers to ATMs to prepay their fines under threat of jail for non-jailable tickets. Um and then they closed the case before the initial appearance date, which makes it really hard to advocate for people. And uh I can't convince the JP to change that practice at all, even if I bring it up directly to her face. Uh kinda funny. Uh, that's the Yellowstone County Justice of the Peace, Walker. In case you'd like to donate to the opposition. I don't know.