SPEAKER_01 0:01

Hello, this is R.J. Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in MK Employee Solutions versus trustees of the IAM National Pension Fund. Search your IR to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, argued January 20th, 2026, and decided May 21st, 2026. Pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, ERISA as amended, an employer that stops participating in an underfunded multi-employer pension plan, MPP, must pay the plan withdrawal liability, i.e., the employer's share of the plan's unfunded vested benefits, UVBs. C twenty nine USC section thirteen ninety one. Withdrawal liability is calculated based on the plan's UVBs as of the statutory measurement date, the last day of the plan year preceding the employer's withdrawal. That's sections thirteen ninety-one B2 CAPEI and C2CI and 3 CAPA and 4 CAP A. Determining the value of a plan's UVBs depends upon both hard data, such as the number of beneficiaries in the value of the plan's assets, and a variety of actuarial predictions about the future. One key actuarial assumption is the discount rate, which uh is the interest rate used to discount future benefit payments to their present value. That's 87 Federal Register 62317. Petitioners are for employers who withdrew from an IAM National Pension Fund in underfunded MPP between April and December 2018. The fund assessed each employer's withdrawal liability as of December 31st, 2017, the measurement date. In making this calculation, the fund applied a discount rate of 6.5%, which it had adopted with its actuarial firm in January 2018. The fund had previously used a discount rate of 7.5% to value its UVBs. Petitioners each initiated arbitrations, challenging their assessments. In each case, the arbitrators determined that the assessments were erroneous because the fund had applied actuarial assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The arbitrators instead required the fund to use the actuarial assumptions that were in effect on the measurement date, i.e. 7.5% discount rate. The funds sought review in federal district court. The courts disagreed with the arbiters and held that the actuaries could use the assumptions adopted after the measurement date. The DC Circuit affirmed in a consolidated appeal, its decision conflicted with a decision of the Second Circuit, and this court granted sortiari to resolve when actuarial assumptions may be selected for purposes of calculating withdrawal liability. The Supreme Court held. Decision below is affirmed, and Justice Jackson delivered the opinion. The provisions of ERISA governing the calculation of withdrawal liability, sections 1391 and 1393, do not require the actuarial assumptions underlying that calculation to be selected on or before the measurement date. Section 1391 requires withdrawal liability to be calculated based on the value of a plan's UVBs as of the measurement date. Petitioners contend that Section 1391 as of language establishes a deadline for the selection of actuarial assumptions, but Section 1391 sets no such deadline. The term as of is understood to assign an event to one time and the recognition of it to another. That's W. Follette modern American usage at 41. Section 1391's as of language thus means that the hard data that feeds the UVB calculation must be fixed on the measurement date, but the calculation itself can be performed after that date. Actuarial assumptions are not observable facts about the plan. Instead, they're predictive judgments used as tools to calculate UVVs. Accordingly, while Section 1391's as of requirement sets the reference point for factual inputs, it has no bearing on when actuaries must select their assumptions. Section 1393, which governs the use of actuarial assumptions for assessing withdrawal liability, states that the assumptions must be reasonable, take into account the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations, and offer the actuaries' best estimate of anticipated evidence, uh anticipated experience under the plan. Section 1391A1. Section 1393 provides no deadline by which actuaries must select their assumptions, and the court does not generally read limitations into the statutes that do not appear in their text. That's Romag Fashners versus Fossil Group. Indeed, because Congress included a deadline for the selection of actuarial assumptions in a different set section of the statute, but imposed no similar limit in section thirteen ninety-three, the court presumes that the omission in section thirteen ninety-three is intentional.

SPEAKER_00 6:29

See um Rossello versus United States.

SPEAKER_01 6:34

Moreover, Section 1393's instruction that actuarial assumptions reflect the actuary's best estimate, section 1393 A1, supports the conclusion that actuaries can select their assumptions after the measurement date. Requiring actuaries to use assumptions selected before the measurement date could prevent them from relying on the most up-to-date data when selecting their assumptions, resulting in assumptions that do not reflect their best estimate. Petitioners' remaining arguments do not overcome the balance of a textual deadline for adopting actuarial assumptions. First, petitioners point to a different provision of ERISA that prohibits plans from applying any new plan rule or amendment to an employer's withdrawal liability if the rule or amendment is adopted after the employer withdraws. Section 1393A. But the retroactivity limits in section 1394 coincidentally do not apply to actuarial assumptions. Petitioners fall back in a policy argument, contending that allowing plans to adopt actuarial assumptions after the measurement date will invite manipulation, enabling plans and their actuaries to retroactively select assumptions in order to increase withdrawing employers' liability. But petitioners' proposed rule does not address these concerns. And in any event, policy concerns cannot trump the best interpretations of statutory text. That's Patel versus Garland. Congress chose which limits to impose on the selection of actuarial assumptions. And it is not the role of the court to supplant Congress's choices. The decision below is affirmed. Justice Jackson delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Thanks for listening. I think that's the last one for today.