Hello. This is R.J. Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in Fernandez vs. United States, Certiari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Argued November 12, 2025, decided May 28, 2026. Joe Fernandez was indicted in 2013 for his role in the assassination of two gang members. The prosecution's theory was that members of a drug ring had paid Fernandez to act as the backup shooter, and when the primary shooter's gun jammed, Fernandez fired 14 rounds and killed both victims. Fernandez's alleged co-conspirator, Patrick Darge, testified against Fernandez at trial. The jury convicted Fernandez of murder for hire and a firearms offense, and the district court imposed two consecutive life sentences. Fernandez pursued multiple avenues of relief. He first asked the district court to reconsider alleging Brady violations related to the government's failure to disclose that another alleged co-conspirator, Luis Rivera, had denied driving the getaway car. The District Court reviewed the government's notes from interviewing Rivera and concluded that they did not contain relevant information, though the judge noted he was troubled by the government's lenient treatment of Rivera. The Second Circuit affirmed the conviction and sentence, rejecting both the Brady claim and Fernandez's insufficiency of evidence argument. It held that a reasonable jury could credit Darja's testimony and that the evidence was sufficient to support conviction. Fernandez then twice moved for post conviction relief under twenty eight USC section twenty two fifty five. The first motion, arguing actual innocence based on witness' credibility, was described by the Second Circuit as plainly meritless. The second succeeded only in vacating his firearms conviction based on United States versus Davis, thus leaving in place Fernandez's murder for higher conviction. In the order vacating the firearms conviction, the district judge speculated that the government had offered Rivera a lenient plea deal because it knew something inconsistent with Darja's testimony, and potentially and pointedly noted that if Fernandez's life sentence on the murder for hire charge were to be commuted or held unlawful, Fernandez would be released immediately. Fernandez finally filed a motion for compassionate release under 18 USC section 3582, C1 CAPAI, arguing that extraordinary and compelling reasons, above all, that he was innocent, warranted a sentencing reduction. The District Court granted the motion, citing unease about whether Darja's testimony had been truthful, concerns about the government's charging decisions, and doubts about the correctness of the jury's verdict. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that challenges to the validity of a conviction are not cognizable as extraordinary and compelling reasons under Section 3582 C one CAP A. Seven circuits agree with the Second Circuit on that legal issue, while two circuits take the other side. The Supreme Court held decision is affirmed, and Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court. Section 2255 governs collateral attacks on federal convictions and imposes tight procedural constraints, including a one-year statute of limitations, Section 2255 F. A general rule that prisoners get only one shot at collateral relief with narrow exceptions, see sections 2255 H1 and 2. A bar on relitigating claims already raised and rejected on direct review, see Kaufman v. United States. And procedural default rules requiring demonstration of cause and prejudice or actual innocence for claims not raised on direct review. See Pricer v. Rodriguez and other statutes must be read in harmony with the habeas framework. See District Attorney's Office for Third Judicial District vs. Osborne. In Pricer, the court held that even though the prisoners' claims came within the lateral terms or literal terms of 42 USC Section 1983, Congress's determination that habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or length of their confinement must override the general terms of Section 1983. A contrary result would allow prisoners to evade the rigorous requirements of post-conviction relief and wholly frustrate explicit congressional intent. In Gonzalez v. Crosby, the court held that prisoners may not use Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60B to argue that a denial of habeas relief was wrong on the merits, because allowing such motions would permit movements to circumvent the strict statutory habeas standards. Applying these principles, challenging the validity of a conviction through a compassionate release motion circumvents the exacting requirements of Section 2255. Fernandez candidly admits that avoiding 2255's procedural and substantive requirements is the benefit of his approach. His strategy would enable prisoners to bypass 2255 by challenging convictions repeatedly for years after they became final, and regardless whether the issues had already been raised or decided in prior proceedings. The text and structure of thirty five eighty two confirms that the invalidity of a conviction is not among the extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying compassionate release. Extraordinary means most unusual, far from common, and having little or no precedent. That's Webster's third New International Dictionary at eight oh seven. While compelling means tending to convince or convert by or as if by forcefulness of evidence. An argument that is compelling in one context is not necessarily so in another, and a reason is not compelling if Congress has channeled it through the post-conviction statutes. The name for Section 3582 C one CAPA, compassionate release, highlights its focus on granting mercy rather than righting legal wrongs. Congress gives special protection to defendants with terminal illness, 3582 D, expressly identifies that relief is available for elderly prisoners who have served lengthy sentences and are not dangerous. And has permitted the Sentencing Commission to treat rehabilitation as a relevant consideration. The role of the Bureau of Prisons reflects the statute's focus on a defendant's personal circumstances, such as advanced age, safety risk, illness, and rehabilitation. The Bureau's institutional expertise lies in the daily lives of prisoners, so it makes little sense to have the Bureau evaluate legal arguments and comb trial records to determine whether a prisoner has a compelling argument that his conviction was wrongful. Regulatory history points the same way. For decades, the sentencing commission has tied the availability of compassionate release to a defendant's personal circumstances and has never said that the invalidity of a conviction can be an extraordinary and compelling reason warranting compassionate release. Fernandez's argument that Section 2255 and Section 3582 offer different forms of relief does not help him. The difference in relief highlights the mismatch between the error he alleges and the remedy he seeks. When a prisoner persuades a court that his conviction is invalid, the remedy of a little less prison time does not redress the wrong. If a conviction is invalid, the fitting remedy is to vacate it as 2255 allows. When a prisoner's request for relief serves as a challenge to conviction often turns on the nature of the arguments presented. See for example Gonzales at 531 and 533. If a prisoner moves for relief because of alleged problems with the underlying criminal investigation or trial, his motion suggests that his conviction is flawed. This case demonstrates as much. The District Court found there was reason to question the verdict, meaning that it harbored doubts about the soundness of the conviction. Fernandez's backup argument that actual innocence claims must be cognizable under thirty five eighty two, because such claims have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief absent in independent constitutional violation fails. No court has concluded that Fernandez was actually innocent. In any event, a prisoner asserting actual innocence challenges the validity of his conviction. That's Herrera versus Collins. And that lies close to the core of habeas corpus. That's Pricer. Section 3582 does not provide a shortcut around the post-conviction statutes. The decision below is affirmed. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayer filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Kagan joined. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. Thank you for listening. We will be caught up on the uh remainder of these here shortly.