Hello. This is R.J. Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in Rutherford versus United States, sortiary to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. Argued November 12, 2025, and decided May 28, 2026. And that was decided together with 24860 Johnny Markle Carter versus United States on sortiari to the same court. Petitioner Daniel Rutherford was convicted of two counts of using and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 USC Section 924C. Petitioner Johnny Carter was convicted of three Section 924C violations. At the time each was sentenced, a defendant convicted of two 924C counts was subject to a mandatory 25-year sentence for the second offense that would be stacked, i.e., run consecutively to the first offense's mandatory penalty. That sentencing scheme resulted in a 32-year minimum sentence for Rutherford's Section 924C violations, and a 57-year minimum sentence for Carter's violations. Years later, Congress passed the First Step Act of 2018, which eliminated the 25-year stacking requirement for first-time offenders. Rutherford and Carter do not qualify for the Act's reduced penalties because the amendment to 924C does not apply to defendants sentence before the Act. In separate proceedings below, however, Rutherford and Carter each invoke the non-retroactive change to Section 924C as basis for a sentence reduction under Section 3582C1 CAPAI. Section 3582 C1 CAPAI, commonly referred to as the Compassionate Release Provision, allows a court to reduce a prisoner's term of imprisonment if the court finds, after considering the Section 3553A factors, that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction, and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Senten Commission. The court below held that the non-retroactive change to Section 924C cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a reduced sentence. The Third Circuit explained in Rutherford's case that the Commission's 2023 amended policy statement, which adds unusually long sentence to the list of extraordinary and compelling reasons that might warrant compassionate release under certain circumstances. See USSG app C amendment eight one four conflicts with the will of Congress, expressed in the statute and thus cannot be considered in determining a prisoner's eligibility for compassionate release. The court granted sortiari in these consolidated cases to resolve the split of circuit authority over whether the disparity created by a non retroactive change to sentencing law is an extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants compassionate release. Decision below is affirmed, and Justice Barrett delivered the opinion again. When Congress declines to make a sentencing amendment retroactive, as with the change to Section 924C, the resulting sentencing disparity cannot serve as an extraordinary and compelling reason that warrants a sentence reduction under 18 USC Section 3582, C1KI. The plain text of Section 3582 C1 Cap A I empowers a district court to reduce the term of imprisonment if it finds, among other things, that extraordinary and compelling reasons weren't such a reduction. Section 3582 C1 Cap A I. Under the ordinary meaning of the terms extraordinary and compelling, reasons are those that are especially unusual and convincing. The disparity created by Congress's amendment to Section 924 C does not satisfy this definition. Far from extraordinary, non-retroactive amendments to criminal penalties are the norm. Changes to statutory penalties usually benefit only future offenders. When Congress derivates from the default by extending the revised penalties to defendants not yet sentenced, the ordinary practice is to withhold that change from defendants already sentenced. That's Dorsey versus United States. Such a disparity is an unexceptional feature of a system in which non-retroactivity is the default. As for compelling, it's hard to see how Congress's deliberate decision not to extend newly reduced penalties to those already sentenced could be a convincing reason that warrants a sentence reduction. Congress decided to apply the lower prison sentences to some violators of Section 924C, but not to others, reinforcing its interest in finality and avoiding burdening district courts with additional litigation. That's Hewitt v. United States in a plurality opinion. Treating the disparity resulting from Section 924C's amendment as compelling reason for reducing a sentence would undermine Congress's choice to leave the sentence intact. It would also fall well outside the heartland of compassionate release, which has long been defined by a prisoner's personal circumstances, such as medical condition, age, family circumstances. Petitioners' arguments, to the contrary, lack merit. While the terms extraordinary and compelling leave room for judgment, they are not so flexible as to encompass any consideration. Their meaning depends on context. A reason is extraordinary and compelling only if it is sufficiently unusual and convincing to warrant compassionate release. The disparity resulting from Congress's amendment to Section 924 C is neither extraordinary nor compelling. Rather, it tracks ordinary sentencing practice and reflects Congress's deliberate choice to extend relief to some prisoners and not others. Petitioners argue that because Congress empowered the Sentencing Commission to describe the grounds for compassionate release with only one express limitation, rehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be considered an extraordinary and compelling reason. That's 28 USC Section 994T. Congress impliedly authorized the district court to consider all other relevant information. That argument fails because the force of any negative implication depends on context. That's uh in LRP vs. Southwest General Incorporated, quoting Marx versus General Revenue Corporation. By addressing rehabilitation, Congress did not impliedly bless all other considerations. Instead, it singled out rehabilitation to break from the old sentencing and parole system. Petitioners also note that courts ordinarily enjoy broad discretion to consider all relevant information when imposing or modifying a sentence. But petitioners skip a step. Before determining the extent of a reduction based on the Section 3553A factors, a court must first ensure that a movement is part of the limited class of prisoners who are eligible for such reduction. That's Dillon versus United States again. Eligibility depends on whether the prisoner can offer extraordinary and compelling reasons that warrant compassionate release, not on the Section 3553 A factors. This gatekeeping requirement imposes independent and ascertainable limits on access to compassionate release. That's Concepcion versus United States. Concepcion versus United States is not to the contrary. That case involved the sentence modification proceedings under a different provision of the Act, where eligibility for a sentencing reduction was conceded, and the only question was what information the court could consider in modifying a sentence. Because the provision of the Act at issue in Concepcion lacks any limiting language, we held that a court could consider changes to the guidelines, as well as interviewing or intervening facts, and when calculating a new sentence under it. Today's cases differ from Concepcion because they concern whether a prisoner is eligible for compassionate release in the first place. And on that score, Congress has expressly cabined district courts' discretion by prohibiting a reduction in sentence unless a court finds that extraordinary incompelling reasons warrant it. Finally, petitioners downplay the conflict between the Act and their interpretation of Section 3582 C1 Cap AI. The Act reflects Congress's choice not to extend relief on a categorical basis, but on their approach, a district court could treat the disparity between a pre and post act sentence as one of at least two considerations that, taken together, warrant compassionate release. The implications of petitioners' arguments are sweeping. Under the same logic, could a judge who believes that a mandatory minimum is unduly harsh treat the severity of a sentence as an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release? Petitioners decline to rule out this possibility. Yet it is the legislature, not the court, which is to define a crime and ordain its punishment. That's United States versus Wiltberger, and that's a five wheat. Treating the severity of a mandatory penalty as a reason for compassionate release rejects Congress's judgment that the punishment fits the crime. Petitioner's proposal, injecting other factors into the mix of extraordinary and compelling reasons, does not solve the problem. Petitioner's contention that the court's interpretation of section 3582 C1 CAPAI must yield to the Sentencing Commission's 2023 policy statement misunderstands the Commission's role. Congress empowered the Commission to give meaning to the compassionate release provision by identifying the circumstances that constitute extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. That's some Loper Bright vs. Raymondo. But the Commission's policy statements must be consistent with the governing statute, USC section 994A, and courts have a duty to independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress. The statutory text and structure make clear that Congress's non-retroactive change to Section 924C, considered by itself, or in combination with other factors, cannot make a prisoner eligible for compassionate release. To the extent that the Commission's policy statements, counsels otherwise, it is invalid. The decision below is affirmed. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsich, and Kavanaugh joined. Justice Sotomayor filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Kagan and Jackson joined. Thank you for listening. I do find it a little troubling that uh it's harder to get to compassionate release at this point. Um, somebody's sentences are very unduly harsh.