Hello, this is R.J. Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in Flowers Foods Incorporated versus Brock, sortiary to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, argued March 25, 2026, and decided May 28, 2026. The Federal Arbitration Act requires courts to enforce many private arbitration agreements, but it also provides that nothing in the law shall be used to compel arbitration in disputes involving contracts of employment of any class of workers engaged in interstate commerce. That's 9 USC Section 1. This case poses the question whether someone can qualify as a worker under the Section 1 exemption if he never crosses state lines and never interacts with vehicles that do. Flowers Foods Incorporated is a large producer of packaged baked goods with bakeries in 19 states. To get its products to market, the company depends in part on franchisees who buy the distribution rights to Flowers' products in specific geographic territories. Angelo Brock is one such franchisee serving the Denver area. He picks up Flowers' products from a warehouse in Colorado and delivers them to local stores, all without leaving the state. In 2022, Brock sued Flowers in federal district court, alleging that the company had underpaid him and other distributors in violation of various federal and state laws. Flowers moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the FAA generally requires courts to stay or dismiss cases when the parties have agreed to resolve their disputes by arbitration, and that Brock had signed a distribution agreement promising to arbitrate any disagreement. The district court denied Flowers' motion, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed. Resting its decision on 9 USC Section 1, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that Brock belonged to a class of workers engaged in interstate commerce, and thus the court lacked authority to compel arbitration. Supreme Court held. Decision below is affirmed, and Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion of a unanimous court. Held. A worker who transports goods on an intrastate leg of an interstate journey can qualify for Section 1's exemption without crossing state lines or interacting with vehicles that do. The statutory text does not support a rule requiring workers to cross state lines or interact with vehicles that do. When the FAA was enacted, to engage meant to take part in something, or to be employed or involved in that thing. That's Black's Law Dictionary at 661. And interstate commerce meant traffic, intercourse, or the transportation of persons or property between or among the several states, or from or between points in one state and points in another state. Nothing in those terms requires an individual to cross state lines or interact with a vehicle that does. Interstate commerce includes transporting products between points in one state and points in another state, which involves not just crossing state lines, but intrastate activity too. A continuous carriage may begin in one state and end in another, while much of the journey takes place within the limits of a single state. It's a cyclopedic law dictionary at 548. And at least sometimes a person can take part, be employed, or be involved in that continuous journey without leaving a state or touching vehicles that do. Historical precedent supports this interpretation. In the Daniel Ball at Ten Wall, the court held that a steamer transporting goods entirely within Michigan was engaged in commerce between the states, because it was employed in transporting goods destined for other states, or goods brought from without Michigan. The court explained that the fact that several different and independent agencies are employed in transporting the commodity, some acting entirely in one state and some acting through two or more states, does in no respect affect the character of the transaction. Other cases are to similar effects. See Reardrick versus Pennsylvania, Rhodes versus Iowa, Norfolk and Western Railroad versus Pennsylvania. Flowers' counter arguments are unavailing. Flowers observes that the cases above interpreted the Constitution's Commerce Clause, not Section 1 of the FAA. The court does not suggest that the scope of Section One is coterminous with the scope of the Commerce Clause as interpreted at the time of the FAA's adoption in 1925. However, cases using the same language as Section 1, or formulations very close to it, offer probative evidence of what an ordinary person at the time of the FAA's enactment would have understood its terms to mean. Flowers hints at other reasons why Brock might not qualify for Section 1's exemption, including that Flowers' conduct, its business with Brock through a distribution agreement with an independently operated company Brock owns, and that he orders and purchases Flowers' goods, taking title to them before selling them to local stores. Facts that some lower courts have found relevant. However, while Flowers discusses these facts in passing, it does not ask the court to decide their legal significance. Instead, venturing all upon one cast by asking the court to adopt a bright line rule that an individual can never qualify for Section 1's exemption unless he crosses state lines or interacts with vehicles that do. The statutory text cannot support such a rule. The decision below is affirmed. Justice Gorsuch delivered the opinion for a unanimous court. Thanks for listening. We'll be getting the rest of these up uh sometime soon here.