Hello, this is RJ Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of the United States opinion syllabus in Mullen, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, versus Doe, Sertiari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Argued April 29th, 2026, and decided June 25th, 2026. And there's a little asterisk there that says, together with number 25-1084, Trump President of the United States versus Mayot on Certiari before judgment to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia circuit. The question presented is whether respondents who challenge the termination of a temporary protected status for aliens from Syria and Haiti are entitled to orders postponing the terminations during litigation. Congress created TPS in 1990 to provide short-term humanitarian relief for aliens who cannot safely return to their home countries. Although designated to afford temporary relief, TPS designations in practice have often lasted for decades. Syria received a TPS designation in 2012 because of extraordinary and temporary conditions related to the repressive regime of Bashir al-Assad, 77 Federal Register 19027, and in September 2025, the Secretary of Homeland Security provided public notice that Syria's TPS designation would terminate, 90 Federal Register 45402. Seven Syrian nationals sued in the Southern District of New York, asserting claims under the Administrative Procedure Act to stop the termination. The District Court concluded that the plaintiffs were entitled to interim relief under 5 USC Section 705. The Second Circuit denied the government's request for a stay. Haiti received a TPS designation in 2010 after a devastating earthquake, 75 Federal Register 3477. And in November 2025, the Secretary provided public notice that Haiti's TPS designation would terminate, 90 Federal Register 54739. Five Haitian nationals sued in the district court for the District of Columbia, asserting claims under the APA and charging that the termination of Haiti's TPS designation violated the constitutional right to equal protection because it was motivated by race. The district court granted interim relief, and a divided DC circuit panel declined to issue a stay. The government sought a stay and a writ of certiary before judgment in both cases. This court granted review, consolidated the cases, and deferred ruling on the stay applications. The decision below is reversed and remanded, and Justice Alito delivered the opinion of the court. The TPS statute bars judicial review of nonconstitutional claims. Section 1254A B5 CAPA provides that there is no judicial review of any determination of the Secretary of Homeland Security with respect to the designation or termination or extension of a designation of a foreign state. The term determination may mean either an individual decision or the process leading to a decision. Under either understanding, Section 1254A B five CAPA bars all of respondents' nonconstitutional claims. Further, the phrase with respect to generally has a broadening effect, ensuring that the scope of a provision covers not only its subject, but also matters relating to that subject. See Patel versus Garland, 596 US 328. Respondents and the court courts below offer no sound theories to overcome the plain meaning of the judicial review bar. Respondents' argument that section 1254AB5 cap A applies to only to substantive claims, not those based on alleged procedural errors, finds no support in the statutory language because a determination may concern procedural or substantive questions. Respondents' reliance on McNary v. Haysman Refugee Center Incorporated at 498 U.S. 479 and Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians 476 U.S. 667 is misplaced because those decisions turned on the specific wording of different provisions and did not adopt the broad principle that the term determination applies only to substantive matters. Doe respondents' argument that determination refers only to an assessment of country conditions finds no support in the statute's text or context and contravenes the principle that we give common terms their ordinary meaning. See Yellen versus Confederated Tribes of the Chihales Reservation. 594 U.S. 338. Respondents' attempt to limit the judicial review bar to the Secretary's ultimate determination, not any subsidiary decision, is inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory text and contradicts the administrative law principle that subsidiary decisions merge into final agency action. See Army Corps of Engineers versus Hawks Corporation 578 U.S. 590. The Mayot respondents' equal protection claim that Haiti's TPS designation was terminated because of race is unlikely to succeed. Ironically, respondents themselves offer a race neutral explanation for the government's action. Namely, that the current administration, which has terminated every TPS designation that has come up for renewal, simply opposes the TPS program as it has been implemented in the past. The court assumes, for the sake of argument, that heightened scrutiny applies and that it must determine whether a discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti's TPS designation. That's Arlington Heights versus Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation 429 U.S. 252. Because application of that standard calls for consideration of the context in which a challenge statement was made, the immigration context is an important factor. None of the cited statements by either the president or the secretary was overtly racial, and in substance, all expressed policy views that could rest on race neutral justifications. Viewing all the relevant evidence, Mayot respondents are unlikely to prove that race was a motivating factor in the decision to terminate Haiti's TPS designation, and it follows that they are not entitled to interim relief on their equal protection claim. The decision below is reversed and remanded. Justice Alito announced the judgment of the court and delivered the opinion of the court except as to part 3a. Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas and Justice Kavanaugh joined that opinion in full. And Justice Gorsuch and Barrett joined except for part 3a. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion, and Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Sotomayor and Jackson joined. Thanks for listening. 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