Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)
Following what the Supreme Court is actually doing can be daunting. Reporting on the subject is often only done within the context of political narratives of the day -- and following the Court's decisions and reading every new case can be a non-starter. The purpose of this Podcast is to make it as easy as possible for members of the public to source information about what is happening at the Supreme Court. For that reason, we read every Opinion Syllabus without any commentary whatsoever. Further, there are no advertisements or sponsors. We call it "information sourcing," and we hope that the podcast is a useful resource for members of the public who want to understand the legal issues of the day, prospective law students who want to get to know legal language and understand good legal writing, and attorneys who can use the podcast to be better advocates for their clients.
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Supreme Court Decision Syllabus (SCOTUS Podcast)
Monsanto v. Durnell (Federal Preemption)
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In Monsanto Co. v. Durnell, the Supreme Court held that FIFRA expressly preempts a state-law failure-to-warn claim demanding a cancer warning on Roundup's label, since the EPA had approved the label without one and federal law requires using the approved label. The Court (per Justice Kavanaugh) reversed a $1 million Missouri verdict; Justice Thomas concurred; Justice Jackson, joined by Justice Gorsuch, dissented.
Hello, this is Jeff Barnum reading the Supreme Court syllabus in Monsanto Company vs. Durnell, Sir Sorori to the Court of Appeals of Missouri, Eastern District. Argued April 27, 2026, decided June 25, 2026. Monsanto Company manufactures and distributes Roundup, a glyphosate-based herbicide designed to control weeds. The EPA has repeatedly evaluated glyphosate and repeatedly concluded that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer. EPA's assessment is shared by many other regulatory bodies around the world. In accordance with EPA's view that glyphosate is not likely to cause cancer in humans, EPA has not required labels on glyphosate-based pesticides like Roundup to include a cancer warning. In 2019, John Durnell sued Monsanto in Missouri State Court, alleging that he had used Monsanto's Roundup products for about 20 years and they had caused his non-Hodgkins lymphoma. As relevant here, Dernell brought a failure-to-warn tort claim, asserting that Monsanto should have included a cancer warning on Roundup's label. A jury agreed and awarded Dernell more than $1 million on the failure-to-warn theory. On appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed. This court granted Sir Shirori. Held. FIFRA expressly preempts Durnell's state law failure to warn claim because the claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to Roundup's label. FIFRA's preemption clause, entitled Uniformity, provides that a state shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those required under this subchapter. FIFRA therefore preempts a state law labeling requirement that differs from the federal labeling requirements imposed under FIFRA. To register a pesticide, EPA must approve the pesticides label by determining that the label contains all warnings necessary and adequate to protect health and the environment, and that the label does not include any false or misleading statements. After EPA approves a pesticides label at registration, manufacturers are legally required to use that label unless and until EPA approves or requires a label change and amends the pesticides registration. If a manufacturer does not use the EPA approved label, it may be subject to civil and criminal penalties. Federal law therefore requires Monsanto to sell Roundup with the label that EPA approved at the initial registration, and that EPA has subsequently reapproved on multiple occasions, that is, the label without a cancer warning. Meanwhile, as the court's precedents make clear and as the parties agree, state tort duties constitute state labeling requirements. Durnell's state tort claim would require Monsanto to add a cancer warning to its labels, which is, in addition to and different from, Monsanto's federal law labeling obligations. The court's decision in Regal v. Medtronic Inc.2 US 312, a Supreme Court case from 2008, further confirms that Dernell's failure-to-warn claim is expressly preempted. In Regal, the court addressed the preemption clause in the Medical Device Amendments of 1976, which is nearly identical to FIFRA's preemption clause. The Regal Court concluded that FDA's pre-market approval of devices imposed requirements under the Act's Preemption Clause, and therefore that FDA's pre-market approval of a medical device preempted state claw claims premised on additional or contrary safety requirements. Dernell's counter-arguments are unpersuasive. Drnell contends that a Missouri failure-to-warn claim, like FIFRA itself, simply requires manufacturers to include adequate warnings to protect human health and not to include false or misleading statements. But that argument operates at far too high a level of generality and disregards the central and comprehensive role that EPA performs in making labeling determinations under FIFRA's registration provisions. Durnell argues that EPA's regulations and its procedures for registering pesticides and approving pesticide labels exceed or contravene EPA's statutory authority under FIFRA. Durnell is incorrect. FIFRA empowers EPA to prescribe regulations to carry out the provisions of FIFRA and expressly directs EPA to register pesticides and determine that the pesticides labeling complies with FIFRA's many specific requirements. During that extensive registration process, EPA critically evaluates the pesticides label to ensure that the label contains all warnings necessary to protect human health. And after EPA decides the appropriate warnings for a pesticides label, a manufacturer is legally required to use that label unless and until EPA subsequently approves or requires a new label. Durnell seizes on 7 United States Code, Section 136A, subparagraph F2, which provides that registration shall not be construed as a defense for the commission of any offense under FIFRA, but that registration is prima facie evidence of compliance with the registration provisions. By its text, section 136A, subparagraph F2, does not apply to state tort suits. That provision simply clarifies that registration does not bar EPA enforcement actions against manufacturers for violating FIFRA. Additionally, Monsanto is not invoking the mere fact of registration as a complete defense to state tort suits, but rather is relying on EPA's specific determination that cancer warnings are not required for glyphosate-based pesticide labels. This argument also contravenes Regal, where the possibility that FDA could withdraw its pre-market approval based on new evidence or new analysis did not preclude the court from concluding that FDA's pre-market approval imposed requirements on manufacturers that preempted state tort suits under the Medical Device Amendment's materially identical preemption clause. Reversed and remanded, Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Alito, Sotomayor Kagan, and Barrett joined. Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion. Justice Jackson filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Korsich joined. Thank you for listening. 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