Hello, this is R.J. Deacon, reading the Supreme Court of United States opinion syllabus in Watson, Mississippi Secretary of State, versus Republican National Committee. Certiari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, argued March 23, 2026, and decided June 29, 2026. The Federal Election Day statutes set the day for the election of representatives, senators, and the president on a Tuesday in November. See 3 USC section 1 and 2 USC sections 1 and 7. Mississippi permits certain residents, such as college students, away from home and senior citizens, to vote in federal elections by absentee ballot. That's Mississippi Code Annotated 23-15-713. Mississippi is one of roughly 30 states that count at least some absentee ballots mailed by election day, but received afterward. Absentee voters in Mississippi may dispatch their ballots by mail or common carrier, and all absentee ballots must be postmarked on or before the date of the election and received by the registrar no more than five days after the election, five business days after the election. That's sections 23-15-637 and uh 1A and 3 from, I believe, the Mississippi Code. In 2024, the Republican National Committee, the Mississippi Republican Party, and various individuals sued the Mississippi Secretary of State and several election officials, contending that federal law prevents Mississippi from counting absentee ballots received after Election Day. According to plaintiffs, the Election Day statutes used the word election to refer to two acts, ballot casting and ballot receipt. So by setting the day for the election, these statutes set the deadline for both. The Libertarian Party of Mississippi filed a similar suit, and the District Court consolidated the cases and then granted summary judgment to Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Mississippi's statute is preempted because the Federal Election Day statutes require ballots to be received by Election Day. The Supreme Court held decision below is reversed and remanded, and Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court. The Federal Election Day statutes do not prevent Mississippi from counting absentee ballots postmarked by Election Day, but received up to five days thereafter. Nothing in the Federal Election Day statutes requires ballots to be received by Election Day. The question before the court is narrow. Whether counting ballots postmarked by Election Day but received up to five days later violates the Federal Election Day statutes. Plaintiffs do not challenge the general practice of absentee voting, the use of the Postal Service or common carrier to transmit ballots, early voting, or the counting and certification of votes after Election Day. The court also does not consider the scope of Congress's authority to regulate federal elections. The federal election day statutes do not preempt Mississippi's law because the defining element of an election has always been the electorate's choice of a candidate. And a related federal statute, the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act, UOCAVA, confirms that while federal law dictates when ballots must be cast, state law governs when they must be received. It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that words generally should be interpreted as taking their ordinary meaning at the time Congress enacted the statute. See uh New Prime Incorporated versus Oliveira. At and at all relevant points, the word election was understood to mean the act of choosing a person to fill an office. That's uh Webster uh Webster's New American Dictionary of the English Language at 433. The court has likewise defined the election, or defined election, as the expression of the electorate's choice, explaining that from the time immemorial, an election has been no more and no less than the expression by qualified electors of their choice of candidates. That's United States versus Classic at 313 US 299. The electorate's choice is made when voting is complete, not when ballots are received. The most recent amendment to the Presidential Election Day statutes bears this out. While inserting the phrase election day into the statute and marking that date as a specific Tuesday, Congress also provided that when states modify the period of voting in response to certain force measure events, the term election day shall include the modified period of voting. It's three USC Section 21 at one. The that Congress defined election day with reference to voting indicates that voting is the act governed by the statute. UOC AVA, which requires states to permit absent military and overseas voters to cast absentee ballots in federal elections, and as a backup establishes a federal absentee voting system, 52 USC section 20302A1, reinforces the point. In detailing the system, UOC AVA repeatedly presupposes ballot receipt is a matter of state law. For example, to avoid any double counting, UOC AVA provides that federal absentee ballots shall not be counted if a state receives the voter's state absentee ballot by the deadline for receipt of that ballot under state law, section 2030 B3. If the Election Day statutes established a nationwide ballot receipt deadline, UOC AVA's reference to state ballot receipt deadlines would make little sense. Finally, this interpretation is consistent with the Constitution's requirements for the Electoral College. The Constitution requires the day on which the electors shall give their votes to be the same throughout the United States. The Constitution thus envisions a system in which receipt of votes is necessarily divorced from voting, and it sets the crucial uniform day as the day of voting while leaving receipt to happen later. The federal election day statutes follow the same pattern. Plaintiffs' contrary view that election day statutes require ballots to be received by election day relies heavily on historical practice, precedent, and policy. But the historical practice plaintiffs identify is not dispositive. Plaintiffs overread the court's precedent, and policy cannot override the words Congress chose. Plaintiffs emphasize that in the mid to late 19th century, ballot receipt occurred on Election Day, and that in the Civil War era, states that authorized absentee voting imposed strict election day deadlines for ballot receipt. But plaintiffs admit they cannot precisely tie this historical practice to the text of the Election Day statutes. State legislatures may have used an election day deadline for any number of reasons unrelated to federal requirements. For example, they may have shared plaintiffs' view that an election day deadline avoids the appearance of fraud from late arriving ballots. At bottom, plaintiff's theory is that because 19th century Election Day statutes govern here, so do 19th century voting practices. But statutes do not trap in amber every contemporary practice on the same subject matter. That's United States versus Rahimi, 602 US 680. Plaintiffs' interpretation of the Election Day statutes is at odds with UOC AVA, which presupposes that states retain power to set ballot receipt deadlines. At oral argument, plaintiffs and their amicus, the United States, offered ways to reconcile their interpretation of the Election Day statutes with UOC AVA, but their theories are unpersuasive. Plaintiffs argue that Foster versus Love's definition of election as the combined actions of voters and officials meant to make final selection of an office holder must mean the combined actions of ballot casting and receipt. But Foster is not about ballot receipt and nowhere mentions it. Foster decides only that an election may not be consummated prior to federal election day. That's the same at 72 note four, and specifically refuses to isolate precisely what access state must cause to be done on election day. Finally, plaintiffs' policy arguments about election integrity and voter confidence are properly directed to legislatures, not courts. See, for example, SAS Institute versus ICANNU. And regardless, plaintiffs' definition of election would do little to address the concerns they identify. Plaintiffs argue that Mississippi's election statute or system violates the Election Day statute because the Postal Service and common carriers allow mail to be recalled before it is delivered to election officials, meaning that the electorate's choice is not actually made as of election day. Even if plaintiffs are right about Mississippi law, they would still lose the challenge they have pressed in this litigation. The post-election day ballot receipt is itself unlawful. Post-election day receipt, considered on its own, does not conflict with the Election Day statutes, and state law is preempted only so far as the conflict extends. That's Foster 522 U.S. at 69. The decision below is reversed and remanded. Justice Barrett delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson joined. Justice Alito filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices Thomas and Gorsuch joined, and in which Justice Kavanaugh joined as to all but Parts 2C2 and 3. Thanks for listening.