Hello, this is the Supreme Court Decision Syllabus and National Republican Senatorial Committee versus Federal Election Commission. Sorcerari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. Argued December 9, 2025, decided June 30, 2026. The Federal Election Campaign Act restricts a political party spending on campaign activities in coordination with candidates. In 2001, this court upheld those coordinated expenditure limits as consistent with the First Amendment. See Federal Election Commission versus Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee. Colorado II. Petitioners, a group of candidates in political party committees, challenged FECA's political party coordinated expenditure limits under the First Amendment, arguing that Colorado II is no longer good law. In light of Colorado II, the On Banc U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit rejected petitioners' First Amendment challenge. This court granted Sir Surrari. Held FECA's political party coordinated expenditure limits violate the First Amendment. A. The court has jurisdiction under Article III. At the outset of the litigation, at least one of the plaintiffs, then candidate for Senate J.D. Vance, undisputedly head standing. Vice President Vance still maintains an active statement of candidacy on file with the FEC indicating his intent to run for Senate in 2028, as well as a campaign committee that has raised money for a Senate race, establishing that this dispute is justiciable. B. The First Amendment provides that Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech. End quote. This court has determined that political parties, as well as candidates, private individuals, and outside groups may make unlimited independent expenditures during political campaigns. See Buckley vs. Valio Percurium. This case concerns FECA's limits on spending by political parties in coordination with candidates. One, FECA limits political party coordinated expenditures. FECA's limits impair the parties' traditional forms of communication, such as advertisements, preclude parties from amplifying the voice of their adherents, impose additional monetary costs and burdens on political parties, and inflict a stifling effect on the ability of the party to do what it exists to do. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee Commission versus Federal Election Commission. Opinion of Justice Kennedy. Two. Statutory limits on contributions to candidates or parties are subject to closely drawn scrutiny. To satisfy that standard, a regulation may not be disproportionate and must be necessary and narrowly tailored to its asserted goal. Federal Election Commission versus Ted Cruz for Senate. The court must assess, one, the government's asserted interest in imposing the limits at issue, and two, the fit between the limits in the government's asserted interests. See also Cruz. The political party coordinated expenditure limits fail to satisfy the closely drawn test. 3. To analyze FECA's limits on political party coordinated expenditures, the court must first assess the asserted governmental interests justifying those limits. The court's precedents recognize only one constitutionally permissible government objective for campaign finance restrictions, quote, preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption, end quote. And Congress may target only a specific type of corruption, quid pro quo corruption. Particularly relevant here, this court has recognized the risk of quid pro quo corruption or its appearance when a donor's contributions to a political party are earmarked, that is, are directed in some manner to a candidate or officeholder. Ultimately, the First Amendment question in this case boils down to whether FECA's limits on political party coordinated expenditures are permissible in order to prevent circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates through earmarked contributions to parties. In Colorado 2, this court said that they were. But Colorado 2 applied deferential scrutiny to Congress's political party coordinated expenditure limits. Since Colorado II, however, the court has emphasized that under the closely drawn test, judicial review must be rigorous, McCutcheon. Under that more demanding standard, the court agrees with petitioners that the political party coordinated expenditure limits are not proportionate, necessary, and narrowly tailored given the other less speech restrictive tools available to the government to prevent circumvention, in particular, earmarking and disclosure laws. With respect to earmarking laws, FECA treats an individual's contributions to a party that are in any way earmarked or otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to a federal candidate as contributions from such person to such candidate, and thus subject to limits on contributions to candidates. 52 USC 30116A8. In McCutcheon, the court explained that such earmarking rules constitute a targeted and constitutionally permissible way for the government to prohibit circumvention of the base limits on contributions to candidates. As Justice Thomas has explained, vigilant enforcement of the earmarking rules is a more precise response by the government to any circumvention concerns. Colorado 2, dissenting opinion. With respect to disclosure laws, FECA requires that political parties and candidates publicly disclose both the contributions they receive and their spending on campaign activities, including on coordinated expenditures. 3104B. As the court emphasized in McCutcheon, disclosures become a much stronger anti-circumvention tool over time because of modern technology, especially the internet. Importantly, it is the combination of the base contribution limits plus the earmarking rules plus the disclosure requirements together that serve the government's anti-circumvention interests here, without unduly restricting core political party speech. Given the meaningful prophylictic measures available to combat quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, the court concludes that the political party coordinated expenditure limits at issue here are disproportionate and are not necessary and narrowly tailored for the circumvention interests. Quotation marks omitted. C. Amicus and interveners contend that the court should adhere to Colorado II is a matter of starry decisis, but Colorado II's reasoning has been rejected by the court's more recent precedences and is no longer good law. To the extent that Colorado II has retained any vitality, it is now overruled. Justice Kavanaugh delivered the opinion of the court, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas Alito, Gorsuch, and Barrett joined. Justice Kagan filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Otomaior and Justice Jackson joined. Thanks for listening. This is Jake Lehu with the Supreme Court Decision Syllabus. It's been a great term. Be sure to leave a review, rate, and share the podcast. And as always, thank you for listening.