Hello, this is RJ Deakin, reading the Supreme Court of the United States opinion in Donald Trump, President of the United States versus California on application first day. Also, Alabama versus California on application first day. And this one was issued August 24th, 2026. I kind of didn't see it coming in. So I'm a little late recording it. It's about 11 pages, so um kind of I guess buckle up if you're gonna go for the uh go for the full one here. Um I will read it. Per curium. The president recently issued an executive order regarding election integrity. A group of states sued the government in the District of Massachusetts contending that the order unconstitutionally infringes on their authority to administer elections. The district court agreed and enjoined the government from implementing the order. In doing so, the district court rejected the government's argument that it lacked jurisdiction over the states' claims because the states lack standing to bring them. The government has asked us to stay the injunction, arguing that it is likely to succeed on the merits of its jurisdictional argument, that the injunction is causing irreparable harm, and that the equities do not favor leaving the injunction in place while the government's appeal is pending. We agree and grant the stay. About five months ago, President Trump issued an executive order designed to maintain public confidence in federal elections. See executive order number 1439 at 91 Federal Register 17125 from 2026. The order is an internal directive from the President to his subordinates mandating that certain agencies pursue certain policies. It neither requires nor forbids anything of anyone outside the executive branch. Three sections of the order are relevant here. First, section 2A orders the Secretary of Homeland Security to take appropriate action to create and send state citizenship lists to each state. These lists will catalog the residents of each state who are U.S. citizens and who will be above the age of 18 at the time of an upcoming federal election. States are not required to use the list, and the Secretary may compile and transmit them only to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law. That's at 17125 to 17126, the 91 Federal Register. Second, Section 2B requires the Attorney General to prioritize the investigation and, as appropriate, the prosecution of state and local officials, or any others who issue federal ballots to ineligible voters. Third, section three B directs the Postal Service to initiate a proposed rulemaking that includes several proposed provisions. One such provision is that outbound ballot envelopes must contain a unique barcode to facilitate tracking. The order does not demand that any proposed provision appear in the final rule. All provisions of the order must be implemented consistent with applicable law. A few days after the order was issued, a group of states in the District of Columbia, here and after states, filed suits in the District of Massachusetts as relevant here. The states argued that sections two and three are unconstitutional and sought to enjoin their implementation. The government countered that the states' suit is not justiciable because the order does not injure them. The District Court largely agreed with the states and entered a final judgment forbidding the government to implement sections two and three as to them for the upcoming midterms. After the First Circuit denied the government's request for a stay, the government sought a stay from this court. To secure a stay pending appeal, the government must show that it is likely to succeed on the merits and that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a stay. See Trump versus Cook from 2026, slip opinion at page eight. It must also demonstrate that the balance of equities does not counsel against relief. Of these factors, the likelihood of success on the merits and the likelihood of irreparable harm are the most cons uh most critical. That's uh NKEN v. Holder from 2009. Um it gives a um a footnote here, and footnote one is the states do not dispute that this application presents a significant legal question. Um that's Trump versus Cook again. Um as to the first factor, the government is likely to prevail on the merits of its argument that the district court lacked the jurisdiction to enter the judgment. Two related doctrines of justice ability block the states' suit. One is standing, which requires an injury that is concrete, particularized, and imminent, rather than a conjectural or hypothetical injury, as Kearney versus Adams, 2020. The other is ripeness, which forbids federal courts to adjudicate disputes that are dependent on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. That's Trump versus New York from 2020. Because standing is not dispensed in gross, we address each challenge provision of the order separately. Um, citing TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez from 2021. Section 2A directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to take appropriate action to create and distribute state citizenship lists. This provision is an internal directive from the president to a subordinate. It imposes no obligation on the states, so they suffer no concrete harm from it. Um, Trump versus New York again. And without concrete harm, there is no standing. Transunion again. The true source of any injury to these states would be the downstream action that the Secretary might take in the future to implement Section 2A. Uh Trump versus New York again. Uh emphasis on might. Section 2A can be implemented only to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law. It's 91 Federal Register 17125. And as the court explained in another case involving a presidential directive with a similar qualifier, any prediction how the executive branch might eventually implement um section two while balancing feasibility and lawfulness is no more than a conjecture at this time. That's Trump versus New York pretty much a full sight, except they um left Section 2a while balancing feasibility and lawfulness out of the quotation. Um that's uh page 131 of Trump versus New York. The Secretary's eventual action will reflect both legal and practical constraints, making any prediction about future injury, just that a prediction. To see why, consider the unduly long chain of inferences necessary to support the state's supposedly concrete injury. Um citation to Clapper versus Amnesty International Note five The District Court first had to speculate about whether it would be feasible for the Secretary to create and transmit the list before the midterms. Uh but Section 2A may not prove feasible to implement in any manner whatsoever. Trump versus New York at 132. The court then had to guess how the secretary might tailor his implementation to be consistent with applicable law. Um 91 Federal Register 17125. Next, the court had to predict what action the Secretary would deem appropriate for implementing Section 2A. After all that, the court still had to estimate whether those actions would be taken in a manner substantially likely to harm the states. Uh, Trump versus New York again at 132. But Article III prohibits federal courts from stacking hypothetical on hypothetical to speculate that harm will eventually materialize. That's Clapper No. 5. Adjudicating this claim requires a prediction not only about whether the Secretariat will act before the midterms, but also about the shape that such action might ultimately take. Article 3 demands more certainty. The lower courts saw it differently, concluding that the states suffered a present injury from Section 2a because it required them to begin planning now on how to comply with it. But the states cannot manufacture standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. Let's clapper again at 416. And the hypothetical future harm that is the state's fear, the Secretary's implementation of Section 2A, is far from certainly impending. By allowing the states to bring this action based on costs they incurred in response to a speculative threat, the district court improperly watered down the fundamental requirements of Article III. Perhaps recognizing the weakness of that standing rationale, the Court of Appeals added another, Section 2A, infringes the state's sovereign authority to create election rules. But Section 2A does no such thing. Instead, it simply directs the Secretary to take certain actions, if appropriate, feasible, and lawful. 91 Federal Register 17125 through 126. This internal directive does not regulate states' voter registration processes, nor does it impinge on the state's authority to create and enforce a legal code for elections. The states lack standing to challenge Section 2B for much the same reason. It does nothing to them. This provision directs the Attorney General to prioritize the investigation and prosecution of those who violate existing federal laws by issuing ballots to ineligible voters. See uh transunion at 424 and 425. The states try to avoid this straightforward analysis by misreading the order. They insist that section 2b credibly threatens them with prosecution if they do not use the citizenship list from section 2a. See um opposition to applications 21-22. See also post at 2 through 3, um, Sudomayor dissenting, post at 1415, Jackson dissenting. Um, but that view is inconsistent with the tech is inconsistent with the text of section two. The states concede that section two A does not require them to use the list at all, assuming they received them in the first place. Umpposition to applications 21. So it is logically impossible for a state to violate section 2A and section 2B. Uh Section 2B does not suggest otherwise. Section 2B directs the Attorney General to prioritize prosecutions of those who violate federal election laws. It then provides an array of existing statutes for the Attorney General to enforce. 91 Federal Register 17126. Absent is any reference to citizenship lists. Without a textual basis for their concerns, the states lack a well-founded fear that they will be prosecuted for not using the list. See Virginia versus American Booksellers Association from 1988. The states' reference to certain state laws allowing 17-year-olds to vote in primary elections is a red herring. See opposition to applications 29-230. Because Section 2B defines eligible voters as otherwise qualified citizens who are 18 years of age or older. Not so. Section 7B of the order requires Section 2B to be implemented consistent with applicable law. That's Federal Register 17127. And on top of that, Section 2B limits itself to only appropriate prosecutions. Given those provisions, the government has unsurprisingly disavowed any intention to prosecute state officials for lawfully providing ballots to 17-year-olds. Last is the state's challenge to Section 3, which directs the Postal Service to issue a notice proposed rulemaking. Opposition to applications 24 to 26 and post at 137 opinion of Justice Jackson. It does not. Section 3 orders the Postal Service to initiate the process of proposing a rule that might bind the states in the future. It is not a proposed rule, let alone a final rule, and it imposes no legal requirements on the states, or for that matter, on anyone outside the executive branch. The district court's conclusion that this internal directive inflicts an Article III injury on the states necessarily rests on an attenuated chain of inferences. It first had to speculate about whether the Postal Service would propose a rule. Then it had to speculate about how the agency would weigh the comments it received. CF Perez vs. Mortgage Brokers Association from 2015 emphasizing that agencies typically must consider and respond to significant comments. Then it had to speculate about whether the agency would issue a final rule. Explaining that a proposed rule is simply a proposal, and an agency might choose to adopt the proposal or to withdraw it. Then it had to speculate about what the final rule would say. CF Encino Motor Cars versus Navarro from 2016, noting that the final rule took the opposite position from the proposed rule. Finally, after all that, the district court still had to speculate about whether the text of a hypothetical final rule would harm the states. It should go without saying that the district court made a decision dependent on contingent future events that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all. Citation from Trump versus New York again. The states cannot preemptively concretize their injury by expending funds before the Postal Service finalizes a rule. Spending money to hedge against a speculative threat does not constitute an Article III injury. Though it may sometimes be reasonable, a reasonable reaction to incur certain costs in advance of a final rule, those costs cannot establish standing when the final rule remains a hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending. Federal courts review final rules, not proposed rules, and certainly not antecedent internal directives to propose a rule. If the Postal Service's final rule harms the states, they may challenge that rule. The remaining stay factors also favor relief. The government is likely to suffer irreparable harm without a stay. The district court's breach of Article III interferes with the internal operations of the executive branch. See INS vs. Legalization Assistance Project of Los Angeles County Federation of Labor from 1993. Justice O'Connor in Chambers' opinion. The injunction bars Homeland Security from trying to comply compile citizenship lists for about half the states in the Union. It purports to forbid the Attorney General to implement the president's enforcement priorities as to those same states. That then comes with a footnote, which is a big one. The principal dissent suggests that if the order does not legally bind the states, then the government cannot suffer irreparable harm from the injunction. See post at three opinion of Justice Sodomayar. The dissent reasons that this is so because the injunction merely prohibits prosecutions stemming from violations or purported violations of the unconstitutional provisions in the order. And if it is impossible to violate the order, then the injunction targets a null set of conduct, so the government suffers no harm at all. But the injunction is far broader than the dissent lets on. It declares all of Section II ultravires as to the states, blocks the government from giving effect to Section II as to the states, and requires the government to prevent explicit or implicit implementation of Section II as to the states. Final judgment number one twenty six-cv one five eight one, which is District of Massachusetts. It is the breadth of these provisions and the resulting intrusion into the executive branch's internal operations that irreparably harms the government. And I'm going back to what we were reading. So it purports to forbid the Attorney General to implement the president's enforcement priorities as to those same states. And it prevents the Postal Service from so much as initiating a rulemaking that could yield a rule applicable to those states, to these states. Because reversal of the district court's judgment would come too late for the 2026 midterms, the district court's errors deal a serious setback to the executive's goals while this litigation unfolds. Coleman versus PACAR from 1976, and it's a rehnquist in chambers. And fighting this court's precedent, Justice Jackson maintains that the government is not injured in the slightest, because the order contemplates that the government will engage in patently unlawful conduct. Post at seven. That, however, remains to be seen. And though Justice Jackson wishes it were otherwise, an applicant can show irreparable harm from the threshold error without also showing that at the end of the day it will prevail on the underlying merits. It's CASA again at 860. Such harm exists here because the injunction meddles in the workings of the executive branch, preventing it from even trying to lawfully implement the order. That's legalization assistance project at 1306. Finally, the balance of equities does not counsel against awarding the government interim relief. The executive order makes no demand of the states, so staying the district court's injunction will not concretely harm them. That is why this suit was not justiciable in the first place. The court's disposition of this application does not mean that any measure taken by the government to implement the order will necessarily be lawful. On that score, time will tell. But the order itself does not harm the states, so the district court lacked jurisdiction to bar the government from trying to implement it. And for the reasons discussed, that injunction is likely to irreparably harm the government if it remains in place while the appellate process runs its course. Accordingly, the application for stay presented to Justice Jackson and by her referred to the court is granted. The injunction entered by the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts is stayed, pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of sortiari in this court, if such a writ is timely sought. Should sortiari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event sortiari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this court. The application for stay presented to Justice Jackson and by her referred to the court is denied as moot. So that's the end of the percurium there. I would uh encourage you if you have a time to go ahead and uh read Justice Jackson's dissent there. I think there's some pretty significant um differences between the majority and the two dissents um included in this percurium opinion. Thanks for listening, and um, I guess again, uh happy birthday to my dad, Al Deacon, out here in in Ham Lake. Um, number 80 is a pretty big one.